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a b s t r a c t
Blind signature is a well-known technique used to construct some advanced applications
for the consideration of user privacy. Various generic ideas and variants on blind signatures
have been brought up so far, but few of them considered the randomization property
or offered formal proofs. The concept of randomization can form a solution for reducing
the threat of coercion or bribery in anonymous electronic voting systems based on blind
signatures. This manuscript will present a blind signature scheme with randomization
based on bilinear pairing primitives. Furthermore, we will also provide concrete security
proofs for the required properties of the proposed scheme under the randomoraclemodel.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
With rapid development of modern technologies, the consciousness of personal privacy has been greatly raised.
Many digitalized applications and services involved in our life emphasize user privacy being preserved more than other
functionalities. Blind signature is an advanced technique which is usually used as an underlying foundation to construct
some privacy-oriented applications, where anonymous electronic voting (E-voting) [1–7] and untraceable electronic cash
systems [8,9] are two popular examples.
The idea of blind signature was pioneered by Chaum in 1983 [8] based on the RSA digital signature scheme, which can
be applied to various privacy-oriented applications to preserve the anonymity of users against leaking user information to
the signer, such as electronic payment on e-commerce and anonymous electronic voting systems. A typical blind signature
protocol involves two kinds of participants – a signer and a group of signature requesters – and it can be divided into four
processes: blinding, signing, unblinding, and verifying. To obtain the signature on amessage, a requester blinds themessage
and submits the blinded message to the signer. In the signing stage, the signer signs the blinded message and sends the
result (i.e., the blind signature) back to the requester. After receiving it, via the unblinding procedure, the requester obtains
the exact signature on the message. The validity of a signature-message tuple can be verified by anyone who intends to.
Subsequently, in 1994, for security consideration, Ferguson [10] came up with his opinion and suggested that the signer
had better inject one or more randomization factors into the message on which it is about to sign to prevent attackers from
predicting the exact content of the message the signer signs. This is referred to as the randomization property. However,
none of the articles in the literature has formally shown that a blind signature is not secure owing to lack of randomization.
Maybe the randomization property is not always a prerequisite for a typical blind signature scheme in security concerns.
However, [3] has been pointed out that randomized blind signatures are the key foundations of uncoercible anonymous
electronic voting. Uncoercibility is an advanced and necessary property in current electronic voting [1–3,5–7]. Besides,
bilinear pairing is a popular mathematical foundation which has been widely-used and adopted to construct various
cryptosystems nowadays [11–15]. Consequently, how to design a provably secure randomized blind signature scheme based
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on bilinear pairing is an important problem which needs to be solved urgently to guarantee the uncoercibility property
of electronic voting based on blind signatures. However, no provably secure randomized blind signature scheme based on
bilinear pairing has been proposed in the literature, until now. In this manuscript, we present the first provably secure
randomized blind signature scheme based on bilinear pairing to solve the above problem.
1.1. Impact of randomization
Unlinkability and Unforgeability are the two basic security properties of a typical blind signature scheme, which can be
applied to construct some practical applications, such as untraceable electronic cash. However, these two properties alone
are not enough to build an uncoercible anonymous electronic voting system. Hence, we need an advanced blind signature
scheme with the randomization property to help us construct uncoercible electronic voting systems against coercion and
bribery.
Here, we briefly describewhywe need a randomization property for achieving uncoercibility in an anonymous electronic
voting system based on the blind signature technique. In an e-voting system constructed upon blind signature techniques,
a legitimate digital ballot usually contains a random string or parameter selected by a voter for the purpose of making all
ballots distinct one another. However, such a mechanism will cause potential coercion or bribery since coercers or bribers
can enforce a voter to attach the intention and a random string (say u) they assigned to form her/his ballot, where the string
u will form the uniqueness part of the ballot to make it distinct with any other ballot. Subsequently, in the counting and
announcing phase, in order to ensure the tally correctness, all legitimate ballots will be published for the electorate to check
and, at this time, the coercers or bribers can identify the vote according to u they assigned previously and check whether
the intention of the vote is identical to their will. Obviously, the coercion can be performed easily and successfully.
In [3], we have shown that there exist some potential hazards which lead to coercion or bribery, and randomized blind
signature is a requisite for achieving uncoercibility in an anonymous electronic voting system based on blind signatures;
i.e., lack of the randomization property will make it difficult to keep the e-voting system away from coercion and bribery.
1.2. Our contribution and paper organization
1. We come upwith a novel blind signature schemewith the randomization property from bilinear pairing primitives, such
that it can form a robust underlying foundation of uncoercible electronic voting systems against coercion and bribery.
2. To the best of our knowledge, apart from the two basic properties (i.e., unlinkability and unforgeability) of a typical blind
signature scheme, we pioneer in providing a concrete definition of the randomization property and a formal proof for
the advanced property in the proposed scheme.
3. The proposed scheme is free from the key escrow problem, where the problem will make it difficult to achieve non-
repudiation because a key generation center has the signing keys of all signers.
The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows. In the next section, we will review some primitives related to bilinear
pairing. In Section 3, the proposed randomized blind signature scheme will be presented. Formal security proofs will be
given in Section 4. The analysis and comparisons between our scheme and other similar ones will be provided in Section 5.
In Section 6, a remark on uncoercibility of e-voting systems will be given. In Section 7, we conclude this work.
2. Preliminary
Some blind signature schemes and variants based on bilinear paring have been proposed in the literature [11–15], but
none of them addressed and discussed the randomization property. In this section, we will review some basic primitives
and constructions related to our scheme.
2.1. Bilinear maps
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group, where both of them with the
same prime order q. A bilinear map operation e : G1 × G1 → G2 satisfies the following three properties.
1. Bilinearity: ∀P,Q ∈ G1 and ∀a, b ∈ Zq, e(aP, bQ ) = e(P,Q )ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃P,Q ∈ G1, such that e(P,Q ) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q ), ∀P,Q ∈ G1, in polynomial time.
Definition 1 (GDH Groups). Let G be a cyclic group generated by P with order q. There are the following two hard problems.
• Computational Diffie-Hellmen (CDH) problem: For a, b ∈ Zq, given P, aP, bP ∈ G, compute abP .
• Decisional Diffie-Hellmen (DDH) problem: For a, b, c ∈ Zq, given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G1, output 1 if c = ab or 0 otherwise.
If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the DDH problem in G but there is no algorithm which can solve the
CDH problem in polynomial time, we say that G is a GDH group.
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2.2. Blind signature with randomization
A randomized blind signature scheme involves a signer and a group of users, and it consists of six basic algorithms as
follows.
• (SK , PK) ← KeyGen(k): Given a security parameter k, the probabilistic algorithm KeyGen(k) outputs a private-public
key pair (SK , PK).
• α ← Blind(m, r, u): Set m as the message to be signed and let (r, u) be random secrets chosen by the user. The
blinding algorithm Blind(m, r, u) outputs a blinded message α ofm. Here r and u are regarded as a blinding factor and a
randomization factor, respectively.
• t ← Sign(α, y, SK ): Input a blinded message α, a random secret y selected by the signer, and the signing key SK , the
signing algorithm Sign(α, y, SK ) outputs a blind signature t .
• s ← Unblind(t, r): Take a blind signature t and a blinding factor r as the input, and then the algorithm Unblind(t, r)
outputs a signature s.
• c ← RandMix(u, y): Input two random values (u, y), the algorithm RandMix(u, y) combines them and outputs c , called
a randomization parameter.
• {0, 1} ← Verify(σ , PK ): Given a signature-message tuple σ , the deterministic algorithm Verify(σ , PK ) outputs 1 if σ is
a valid signature-message tuple or 0 otherwise.
A randomized blind signature protocol requires that
Verify((Unblind(Sign(Blind(m, r, u), y, SK), r),m,RandMix(u, y)), PK) = 1
for messagemwith respect to the blinding factor r and randomization factors (u, y).
3. The proposed randomized blind signature scheme
In this section, we will present the proposed randomized blind signature scheme from bilinear pairing, which is
represented by RBSB in the following. Two kinds of participants – a signer and a group of users – are involved in the
scheme. The details are described below.
1. Initialization phase
• Given a security parameter k, the signer chooses a large prime q, two cyclic groups G1, generated by P , and G2 with the
same order q, and a bilinear pairing operation e : G1 × G1 → G2.• The signer prepares her/his private keys x1, x2 in Z∗q and the corresponding public keys (Pub1 = x1P, Pub2 = x2P).
Besides, let H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 be a one-way hash function.• All public system parameters are (q,H,G1,G2, e, P, Pub1, Pub2).
2. Blinding phase
First of all, a user sends a signal to the signer for starting the protocol. The signer chooses y∈R Z∗q and sends ρ = yP
to the user. After receiving it, the user prepares a plaintext message m, selects u, r1, r2 ∈R Z∗q , sets the randomization
parameter
C = uρ (1)
and computes the blinded message{
α1 = r1H(m ‖ C)+ r2P.
α2 = r1u (mod q). (2)
The user then transmits (α1, α2) to the signer.
3. Signing phase
The signer signs on (α1, α2) by producing
T = x1α1 + x2yα2P (3)
and sends it back to the user.
4. Unblinding phase
After obtaining the blind signature T , the user extracts the signature
S = r−11 (T − r2Pub1). (4)
The signature-message triple is (S,m, C).
5. Verification phase
The validity of the signature-message triple (S,m, C) can be verified via the formula
e(S, P) ?= e(H(m ‖ C), Pub1)e(C, Pub2). (5)
The flow of our protocol is illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. The proposed scheme (RBSB).
4. Formal proofs
In this section, we come up with formal proofs on the correctness, unlinkability, unforgeability, and randomization
properties of our scheme.
4.1. Correctness
Theorem 1. RBSB satisfies correctness.
Proof. Let (S,m, C) be a signature-message triple produced via RBSB. By (4), (3), (2) and (1), e(S, P) = e(r−11 (x1α1 +
x2yα2P − r2Pub1), P) = e(r−11 (x1r1H(m‖C) + r2x1P + x2yr1uP − r2Pub1), P) = e(x1H(m‖C) + x2uyP, P) = e(x1H
(m‖C), P)e(x2uyP, P) = e(H(m‖C), Pub1)e(C, Pub2), and thus formula (5) is satisfied. 
4.2. Unlinkability
Based on the definition of unlinkability introduced in [16,17], we formally define the unlinkability property and prove
thatRBSB meets the unlinkability property in this subsection.
Definition 2 (Linkage Game). Let U0 and U1 be two honest users, S be a signer of a randomized blind signature scheme
described in Section 2.2. All of them are involved in the following game.
• Step 1: The signer S executes KeyGen(k) to generate her/his private-public key pair (SK , PK). Besides, all system
parameters for the signature scheme are published as well.
• Step 2: S produces two distinct messagesm0 andm1.
• Step 3: Choose a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and placemb andm1−b on the private input tapes ofU0 andU1, respectively, where
b is not disclosed to S.
• Step 4: The signer S engages in the randomized blind signature scheme with U0 and U1, respectively.
• Step 5: If U0 and U1 output two valid signature-message triples σb and σ1−b with regard tomb andm1−b on their private
tapes, respectively, then we give the two triples in a random order to S; Otherwise,⊥ is given to S.
• Step 6: S outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1} as the guess of b. S wins the game if b′ = b.
We define the advantage of S winning the game as
AdvLinkRBS(S) = |2Pr[b′ = b] − 1|
where Pr[b′ = b] denotes the probability of b′ = b.
Definition 3 (Unlinkability). A randomized blind signature scheme satisfies the unlinkability property if AdvLinkRBS(S) is
negligible in the linkage game.
Theorem 2. RBSB satisfies the unlinkability property.
Proof. Consider the signer S in the game defined in Definition 2. If S is given⊥ in Step 5 of the game, it means that S cannot
obtain additional information and she/he will determine bwith probability 12 , which is exactly the same as a random guess
of b.
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Fig. 2. Oracles in the Chosen-Target CDH assumption.
Otherwise, we assume that S gets the two signature-message triples (S0,m0, C0) and (S1,m1, C1) after performing
RBSB. For i ∈ {0, 1}, i can represent an instance index ofRBSB. Let (yi, α1i , α2i , Ti) be the view of parameters exchanged
during the signature protocol to S corresponding to instance i.
In order to prove the unlinkability property, we will show that given a triple (S,m, C) ∈ {(S0,m0, C0), (S1,m1, C1)}, for
any view (yi, α1i , α2i , Ti), i ∈ {0, 1}, there always exists a corresponding triple (r ′1i , r ′2i , u′i) such that (1)–(5) hold.
Through (1) and (2), for (S,m, C) and (yi, α1i , α2i , Ti), there always exists (r
′
1i
, r ′2i , u
′
i) such that
C = u′iyiP
and {
α2i = r ′1iu′i(mod q)
α1i = r ′1iH(m ‖ C)+ r ′2iP.
By (3) and (4), S = r ′1i−1(Ti − r ′2iPub1) = r ′1i−1(x1α1i + x2yiα2iP − r ′2iPub1) = r ′1i−1(x1(r ′1iH(m ‖ C) + r ′2iP) + x2yir ′1iu′iP −
r ′2iPub1) = r ′1i−1(x1r ′1iH(m ‖ C)+ x2yir ′1iu′iP) = x1H(m ‖ C)+ x2yiu′iP = x1H(m ‖ C)+ x2C , and thus it implies that formula
(5) always holds.
From the above, given any (S,m, C) ∈ {(S0,m0, C0), (S1,m1, C1)} and for each view (yi, α1i , α2i , Ti)with i ∈ {0, 1}, there
always exists (r ′1i , r
′
2i
, u′i) such that (1)–(5) are satisfied.
Thus, it implies that the signer S succeeds in determining bwith probability only 12 , i.e., the probability of that S wins the
game is 12 . We have that Pr[b′ = b] = 12 and AdvLinkRBS(S) = 0. Therefore,RBSB possesses the unlinkability property. 
4.3. Unforgeability
In [18], Bellare et al. introduced a security assumption, the Chosen-Target RSA-Inversion assumption, for Chaum’s
blind signature scheme to prove its security against signature forgery and the authors mentioned that analogues of this
assumption can be formulated for any one-way function family. Consequently, in [11], Boldyreva came upwith an analogue
of computational assumption, namely the Chosen-Target CDH assumption, which is described below.
Definition 4 (The Chosen-Target CDH Assumption). Let G be a group with prime order q generated by P . An adversary A is
given (P, aP), where a∈R Zq, andA is allowed to access the following two kinds of oracles illustrated in Fig. 2:
• Target oracle (T O):
1. Select a random point Z in G.
2. Return Z as the output.
• Helper oracle (HO):
1. Given an element Z ∈ G as input, compute V = aZ .
2. Return V as the output.
We say that A wins the game if A can output ` pairs {(V1, Z1), . . . , (V`, Z`)}, qh < ` ≤ qt , such that Vi = aZi (1 ≤ i ≤ `)
after making qt T O queries to obtain (Z1, . . . , Zqt ) ∈ Gqt and qh HO queries (qh < qt ).
This assumption states that there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who can win the above game with
non-negligible probability.
Definition 5 (One-More Forgery [19]). Considering a signature scheme, for any integer ` = polynomial(k), where k is the
security parameter, an (`, `+ 1)-forgery means that a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine can compute, after `
interactions with the signer, `+ 1 valid signatures with non-negligible probability. The one-more forgery is an (`, `+ 1)-
forgery for some integer `.
Theorem 3. RBSB is secure against one-more forgery under the Chosen-Target CDH assumption.
Proof. Assume thatA is an adversarywho succeeds in one-more forgery onRBSB. Thenwe can construct a solver Sˆwhich
can help us breaking the Chosen-Target CDH assumption by means of the capability of A. We describe the scenario of the
simulation as follows.
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Fig. 3. Oracles of unforgeability.
Initiation: Let (q,H,G1,G2, e, P, Pub1, Pub2) be the public system parameters ofRBSB where we set Pub1 = aP , simulate
H , and let (P, aP) be the challenge from the Chosen-Target CDH assumption. Besides, Sˆ is given the partial private key x2
where Pub2 = x2P . Sˆ is allowed to access oracles offered in the Chosen-Target CDH assumption (i.e., T O and HO) for
simulating the oracles forA.
Oracle query: Sˆ can access the target oracle T O to get a random element Z ∈ G1 and the help oracleHO to obtain aZ for
some input Z ∈ G1, respectively, in the Chosen-Target CDH assumption. Subsequently, Sˆ will simulate two types of oracles
(i.e. Oh and Os) forA to query.
A canmake two kinds of oracle queries, hash queries from oracleOh and signing queries from oracleOs, defined in Fig. 3.
The details of the simulation are described below.
• Detect(m, C)
1. Detect is a procedure used to check whether there exists a record, with a prefix as the input, in list Lh or not.
2. If there exists a record prefixed by (m, C), it will return 1.
3. Otherwise, it will return 0.
• Oh:
1. WhenA queries Oh for the hashed value on the input (m, C), Sˆ will call a checking procedure Detect(m, C) to check
whether (m, C) had been queried before or not.
2. If (m, C) had been queried, retrieve Z from the list Lh by taking (m, C) as the search index.
3. Otherwise, Sˆ will query T O to obtain a random element Z ∈ G1 and store the record (m, C, Z) in Lh for preserving
consistency.
4. Return Z toA.
• Os:
1. When A sends (α1 ∈ G1, α2 ∈ Zq) as input, for acquiring the signature, Sˆ will take α1 as the input ofHO to obtain
T1 = aα1.
2. Sˆ computes
T = T1 + x2yα2P.
3. Return T as output toA.
Forgery and problem solving: After qr and qs queries toOh andOs, respectively, ifA can output ` valid signature-message
triples (S1,m1, C1), . . . , (S`,m`, C`) inRBSB, qs < ` ≤ qr , and then Sˆ can compute
Vi = Si − x2Ci = aZi for 1 ≤ i ≤ `
and output (V1, Z1), . . . , (V`, Z`) as ` valid instances in the Chosen-Target CDH assumption such that qh = qs < ` ≤ qr = qt ,
where qt and qh are the numbers of the queries to T O and HO, respectively. Therefore, it contradicts the Chosen-Target
CDH assumption. 
4.4. Randomization
Definition 6 (Randomization). Let (s,m, c) be an instance of valid signature-message triple generated from a blind signature
scheme, where m is the plaintext message to be signed, c is the randomization parameter, and s is the signature on (m, c).
Given a random element c ′, we say that the scheme satisfies the randomization property if there exists no polynomial-time
adversary who can output a valid signature-message triple (s,m, c) satisfying c = c ′ with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 4. InRBSB , given a random element C ′ ∈ G1, if there exists a polynomial-time adversary who can produce a valid
signature-message triple (S,m, C) satisfying C = C ′ with non-negligible probability, then we can solve the CDH problem with
non-negligible probability.
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Proof. If there exists an adversaryAwho can successfully output a valid signature-message triple (S,m, C ′) for some given
C ′ ∈ G1 inRBSB, then we can construct a solver Sˆ to solve the CDH problem by means of the capability ofA. The details
of the simulation are described as follows.
Initiation: Let (q,H,G1,G2, e, P, Pub1, Pub2) be the public system parameters of RBSB and (P, aP, bP), a, b∈R Zq be a
challenge from the CDH problem. We give Sˆ the partial private key x1 where Pub1 = x1P and set Pub2 = aP . Sˆ only needs
to simulate the signing oracle of RBSB for A. Furthermore, Sˆ gives A the parameter C ′ = bP as a challenge for the
randomization property.
Oracle query:A is allowed to query the signing oracle Os as follows.
• Os: WhenA inputs (α1 ∈ G1, α2 ∈ Zq) to the signing oracle Os for acquiring the signature, Sˆ will compute
T = x1α1 + yα2Pub2
and transmit T back toA.
Solving the problem: After qs queries to Os, ifA can output a valid signature-message triple (S,m, C) inRBSB such that
C = C ′, then Sˆ can compute
S − x1H(m ‖ C) = x1H(m ‖ C)+ aC − x1H(m ‖ C) = abP
and solve the CDH problem. 
5. Performance and security analysis
Here we compare the proposed randomized blind signature scheme and other similar works [11–15] with a potential
randomization property.
5.1. Performance analysis
In our scheme, there are seven scalar multiplications in G1, one map-to-point hash operation, three point addition
computations, one inverse operation in Zq, and three modular multiplications to produce a signature-message triple
(S,m, C). We need three pairing computations, one map-to-point hash operation, and one scalar multiplication to verify
the validity of a signature-message triple.
According to [20–22], we can summarize and induce the time cost of all operations as follows, Tp ≈ 6te ≈ 1440tm,
Ts ≈ 29tm, Te ≈ 21tm, Tm ≈ th ≈ tm, Th ≈ 23tm, T+ ≈ 0.12tm, and te ≈ tinv ≈ 240tm, where Tp, Ts, Tm, Te, Th, T+, tinv, th, and
tm represent the time cost of one scalar multiplication in G1, one scalar multiplication in G2, one modular exponentiation in
G2, onemap-to-point hash operation, one point addition operation, one inverse operation inZq, one hash operation, and one
modular multiplication in Zq, respectively. Therefore, the total computation cost of our scheme is 4842tm for producing and
checking the validity of a signature-message tuple. Following the above analysis, there are 3230tm, 6200tm, 6575tm, 4520tm,
and 3289tm in [11–15], respectively.
5.2. Security analysis
Basically, [12–15] are constructed based on an ID-based cryptosystem, where KGC (Key Generating Center) is always
involved in each of these schemes to take charge of key-pair issuing for all users. Therefore, [12,14,15] may suffer from key
escrow problems since KGC handles the key-pair of every user and it is capable of impersonating any user to produce valid
signature-message instances without being detected.
Besides, [11] is a pure and simple blind signature scheme without providing any additional functionality. Furthermore,
the schemes of [12–15] have potential randomization (i.e., the randomization property may be satisfied or not) because
none of them discussed the randomization property or even provide formal proofs for it.
The details of the comparisons are summarized in Table 1.
6. Remark on uncoercibility
Consider an e-voting system based onRBSB without the randomization parameter C (i.e., without the randomization
property). It implies that every ballot will be formed as (S,m) satisfying S = x1H(m)+ x2P and the verification formula
e(S, P) = e(H(m), Pub1)e(P, Pub2)
wherem represents the intention attached with a random string u chosen by the ballot owner. Under this circumstance, as
wementioned in Section 1.1, the coercers or bribers can enforce the voter to choose a designated u and identify the vote via
u to check whether the intention of the vote is identical to their will or not. Obviously, the coercion will be successful.
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Table 1
Performance and security comparisons.
[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] Ours
Performance
Signature
generation:
3Ts + 1tinv + 1Th 2Tp + 5Ts + 1Te + 1Tm +
2T+ + 1tinv + 1tm + 1th
2Th + 9Ts + 1T+
+2tinv+3tm+1th
1Tp + 6Ts +
4T+ + 2tm + 1th
5Ts + 1T+ +
1tinv + 2tm + 1th
7Ts + 1Th +
3T++ 1tinv + 3tm
Signature
verification:
3Tp 2Tp + 1Tm + 1Ts + 1th 4Tp + 1Th +
1th + 1T+
2Tp + 1Te +
1Tm + 1th
2Tp + 1Ts +
1T+ + 1th
3Tp + 1Th + 1Tm
Total: ≈3230tm ≈6200tm ≈6575tm ≈4520tm ≈3289tm ≈4842tm
Security
Without key
escrow:
Yes No Yes No No Yes
Unlinkability: Not offered Formally proved Not offered Formally proved Formally proved Formally proved
Unforgeability: Formally proved Formally proved Not offered Formally proved Not formally
proved
Formally proved
Randomization: Not satisfied Not discussed Not discussed Not discussed Not discussed Formally proved
According to [20–22], Tp ≈ 6te ≈ 1440tm , Ts ≈ 29tm , Te ≈ 21tm , 1Tm ≈ th ≈ tm , Th ≈ 23tm , T+ ≈ 0.12tm , te ≈ tinv ≈ 240tm .
Notations:
Tp: the time cost of a pairing operation
Ts: the time cost of a scalar multiplication in G1
Tm: the time cost of a scalar multiplication in G2
Te: the time cost of a modular exponentiation in G2
Th: the time cost of a map-to-point hash operation
T+: the time cost of a point addition operation
tinv : the time cost of a inverse operation in Zq
th: the time cost of a hash operation
tm: the time cost of a modular multiplication in Zq
By contrast, in an e-voting system based on RBSB, due to the randomization property (i.e., with the randomization
parameter C), no voter can remove y, chosen by the tally center (the signer), from C . Furthermore, owing to the unlinkability
property, for every published ballot (Si,mi, Ci) and some random string u assigned by a coercer or briber, there always exists
a corresponding parameter y′iP such that Ci = uy′iP . Hence, no longer does the coercer succeed in coercion through the pre-
assigned string u. This type of coercion will lead to fail.
7. Conclusions
We have presented a novel construction on a pairing-based blind signature scheme to offer the randomization property
from GDH groups. The formal proofs for the unlinkability, unforgeability, and randomization properties of the proposed
scheme have been provided in this manuscript as well. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme is the first
provably secure randomized blind signature scheme. Nevertheless, in order to achieve our goal, we have paid some
additional computation cost. How to design a more efficient and provably secure randomized blind signature scheme is
an interesting and non-trivial research topic.
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